There is no practical problem with faithless presidential electors (i.e., presidential electors who cast their vote in the Electoral College for someone other than the official nominee of the political party under whose banner the elector was chosen). However, if anyone thinks that there is a problem, the states already have ample constitutional authority to remedy it. Moreover, the National Popular Vote bill virtually eliminates the possibility of a faithless elector affecting the outcome of a presidential election (for reasons explained below).

First, faithless electors are not a practical problem. Presidential electors are committed party activists who are nominated by their political party to cast a pre-announced vote when the Electoral College meets. Of the 21,915 electoral votes cast for President in the nation's 55 presidential elections between 1789 and 2004, only 11 were cast in an unexpected way. Moreover, among these 11 cases, the unexpected vote of Samuel Miles for Thomas Jefferson in 1796 was the only instance of a true faithless elector (that is, a situation where the elector might have thought, at the time he voted, that his vote might affect the national outcome). Nine of the other 11 cases were simply post-election grand-standing votes cast by publicity-seeking electors who knew, at the time they voted, that their vote definitely would not affect the outcome in the Electoral College. One electoral vote was accidentally and unintentionally cast by a presidential elector who absentmindedly voted for his party's vice-presidential candidate for both President and Vice President.

Second, if anyone perceives faithless electors to be a real problem, the states already have ample authority to remedy the problem by means of state law. For example, Pennsylvania law empowers each presidential nominee to nominate the elector candidates who run under his name in Pennsylvania. North Carolina law declares vacant the position of any contrary-voting elector and empowers the state's remaining electors to immediately replace the contrary-voting elector with a loyal elector. Either the Pennsylvania approach or the North Carolina approach, or a combination of the two, constitutes an effective remedy against the perceived problem of faithless presidential electors. The U.S. Supreme Court has upheld state laws guaranteeing faithful voting by presidential electors (because the states have plenary power over presidential electors).

Third, the National Popular Vote bill is superior to the current system with regard to the virtually non-existent problem of faithless electors because it would further reduce the slim possibility that a faithless presidential elector could affect the outcome of a presidential election. Under the National Popular vote compact, the nationwide winning candidate would generally receive an exaggerated margin (roughly 75%) of the votes in the Electoral College in any given presidential election. The reason is that the National Popular Vote bill guarantees that the presidential candidate receiving the most popular votes in all 50 states and the District of Columbia will receive at least 270 electoral votes from the states belonging to the compact. Then, in addition to this bloc of at least 270 electoral votes, the nationwide winning candidate would receive a certain number of additional electoral votes from whichever non-compacting states he or she happened to carry. Because the non-compacting states would likely be divided approximately equally between the candidates, the nationwide winning candidate would generally receive an exaggerated margin (totaling roughly 75%) of the votes in the Electoral College. Thus, it would be virtually impossible for a faithless elector to affect the outcome of the presidential election.

Questions about the possibility of faithless electors often stem from the incorrect assumption that presidential electors are a lofty group of independent-minded people who sit in judgment of the people's choice for President, and then graciously accede to the people's choice. It is true that the Founding Fathers envisioned, in 1789, that the presidential electors would be outstanding citizens who would meet and debate and exercise independent judgment in choosing the best person to become President. However, that expectation was dashed with the emergence of political parties in the nation's first competitive presidential election in 1796. Since 1796, presidential electors have simply been willing "rubberstamps" for their party's nominee for President.

For additional information about faithless electors, see section 2.12 of this book.

No coercion is required to get presidential electors to vote as intended under either the current system or the National Popular Vote system. Under both systems, each political party nominates strongly opinionated and very loyal party activists for the position of presidential elector. Each party's nominees for the position of presidential elector intend to act as willing "rubberstamps" for their party's nominee. In November, the voters decide which slate of elector candidates (Republican or Democratic) will actually cast the state's electoral votes. Under the winner-take-all rule (currently used in 48 of the 50 states and the District of Columbia), the state's presidential electors are the elector candidates associated with the presidential candidate receiving the most popular votes within each separate state. In two states (Maine and Nebraska), the presidential electors include the elector candidates associated with the presidential candidate who receives the most popular votes in each of the state's congressional districts.

Under the National Popular Vote compact, the state's presidential electors would be the elector candidates associated with the presidential candidate who won the most popular votes in all 50 states and the District of Columbia. This bloc of at least 270 presidential electors would reflect the will of the voters nationwide. No one in this bloc of 270 (or more) presidential electors would be asked to vote contrary to his or her own political inclinations or conscience. Instead, these electors would vote for their own strongly held personal choice, namely the nominee of their own political party. Under the National Popular Vote bill, these 270 (or more) presidential electors would operate as willing "rubberstamps" for the nationwide choice of the voters, just as presidential electors currently act as willing "rubberstamps" for the statewide choice of the voters (or district-wide choice, in the cases of Maine and Nebraska).

Hypothetical scenarios about the possibility of faithless electors stem from the incorrect assumption that the public favors the current system of awarding all of a state's electoral votes to the presidential candidate who receives the most popular vote in each separate state (the winner-take-all-rule). This incorrect assumption leads to speculation that presidential electors might succumb to pressure from a state's citizens to abandon both their own strongly held convictions and their own party's nominee in favor of the candidate who carried a particular state. However, the reality is that there would be no such pressure in the first place. In polls since 1944, 70% (or more) of the American people have said that they believed that the presidential candidate receiving the most votes throughout the United States should win the Presidency. A mere 20% of the public supports the current state-by-state winner-take-all system (with 10% undecided). That is, the public is not attached to the current system of awarding electoral votes on the basis of the state-by-state count but, instead, strongly opposes it. If (1) 70% of people believe that the presidential candidate receiving the most votes in all 50 states and the District of Columbia should win the Presidency; and (2) if a state legislature responds to the wishes of 70% of the people of their state and enacts a law providing that the presidential candidate receiving the most votes in all 50 states and the District of Columbia should win the Presidency; and (3) if the presidential campaign is conducted with everyone knowing that the National Popular Vote procedure is the law, then when the time comes for this law to deliver its promised results, there would be little inclination for a party activist to vote against his or her own strongly held personal preference, against his own party's presidential nominee, and against his own state's law. The 20% of the public who support the current winner-take-all system would hardly constitute meaningful "pressure."